ARISTOTLE MADE (RELATIVELY) EASY
Aristotle's thought centers on two pairs of concepts:
Form (morphé) / Matter (hylé)
Potency (dúnamis) / Actuality (enérgeia)
In both pairs, one must concentrate on the relation, not the items related, since (for example) the same thing can be matter with respect to one combination and formed-matter with respect to another.
Examples: A brick is formed matter-earth that has been given a particular form. If it is used in making a house, it is (part of) the matter of the house and the house's form is imposed on it.
A fertilized ovum (of the right sort) is a potential baby; the baby, when it is born, is a potential man or woman. The actual man or woman is a potential good citizen.
Form is to be understood in terms of function. For example, in De anima Aristotle argues that the soul (psuché) is the form of the body, and then adds by way of illustration that if the eye were a separate organism, sight would be its soul. Thus there is a close connection between form and actuality. The form is what makes something what it is, and being what it is (having its characteristic function) is the actuality of the thing.
Aristotle's world is active. His word for concrete thing is ousía, usually translated "substance," derived from a participle of eimí, to be. It means something like "an activity of being" (namely, being a particular something). A human, for example, doesn't just be, but is actively human, doing the things humans characteristically do.
Having a particular potency just means the ability to take on a given form. Only a definite kind of animal body (one with hands and a big brain, for example) can become human. Only an acorn can become an oak. One could speak of a bronze man (a statue), but if pressed the speaker would admit that it isn't a real (actual) man.
The transformation from potency to actuality is not automatic. If the conditions are wrong, the development will not take place or will take place only imperfectly. (Thus the discussion of luck in the Ethics.) An actuality has a relational character; what is actual with respect to one change may be potential with respect to another. An actual person is a potential good person. In general actuality is understood as a kind of good. A good pencil, for example, is one that does well what a pencil is supposed to do.
The actuality of something is treated as a kind of goal (télos), directing the coming-into-being of a thing. It is not an overall goal of the universe or a human or divine purpose. Aristotle is just pointing out that the process leading to (e. g.) the development of an oak is a coordinated one, the various phases being those necessary to bring into being an oak and not something else.
Aristotle makes an important between nature (phúsis) and artifice (techné). A natural thing has its own principle of change; an artificial one does not, but has its form imposed on it from without. The words do not naturally group themselves together to form a play, no matter what the conditions; the elements of an oak tree do organize themselves under the appropriate conditions.
The four "causes": the word usually translated "cause" (aitía) is more accurately "explanation." Aristotle is arguing that there are four general types of explanation for a given process. Part of his purpose is to oppose the idea that chance or luck is a separate, manageable, cause. Which explanation is used depends on whether the emphasis is on the process as a completed event or as something going on; and whether the emphasis is on potentiality or actuality.
| POTENTIAL |
ACTUAL |
|
| STATIC |
Material: what was given form, e.g., bricks. |
Formal: the functional quality of the thing, e.g., house. |
| PROCESSIVE |
Efficient: Actual source of impetus for change. |
Final (telic): the form considered as directing the outcome. |
M. Barnes 1989