1. Standard language and marginalization

The coming of printing in the fifteenth century lowered the cost of text at much the same
time as growing urbanization lowered the cost of distribution, thereby creating
vernacular-language markets for cultural products and differentiating cultural production
in the emerging nations of western Europe. Printing enabled the emergence of the
concept of standardization – the creation of verifiably standard texts, the production of
standardized errata to deal with accidentals, communal knowledge and discussion of such
standardized texts (the Bible, for example), the dissemination of maps, the emergence of
authoritative and disseminable records of laws and the like (Eisenstein 1979:80-88). The
alphabetizing of lists, while not unknown before the arrival of printing, became more
common. Up to that time, the reproduction of texts had been an unstable and imprecise
enterprise, in which appropriation (modification to suit particular readers, paraphrase and
abridgment, improvement) had often been more important than duplication; and hence
texts changed, sometimes quite radically, through the process of transmission.1

The standardization of vernacular languages which accompanied these developments was
one element in the emergence of standardization and replicability as common concepts in
civic life – concepts diffused, by the way, from center to periphery (Ruggie 1998:15). It
was related also to the emergence of what might be described as the fostering of capital
investment in ever-greater replicability through advances in technology.

Printing was inexpensive compared to scribal copying – and it was practicable because of
the coming of paper to the west – appearing first in Spain, and commercially established
in Italy only about a century and a half before printing.2 But, despite the cheapness of
paper, printing demanded considerable investment, in paper stocks and in printing
machinery – which put its control in the hands of capitalist publishers who financed

1 We are now on the edge of an electronic revolution, in which both copying and appropriation are
becoming easier, and in which the the idea of the free-standing text is giving way to the concept of the text
linked to other texts. This revolution has major implications for language and language choice.
2 Braudel reminds us (1981:397) that up to then a 150-page manuscript required the slaughter of a dozen
master printers (see for example Febvre & Martin’s discussion of the Buyer family 118-120) who, in turn, were interested in maximizing unit profit and reducing unit cost. Both publishers (for the most part secular, capitalist, and in political control of urban economies) and printers had a vested interest in literacy in vernacular languages because it enhanced both control and profits, and the texts that they produced reinforced replicability in those languages and therefore standardization (Wright 2004:28-29). They wanted to reach the largest possible public and therefore settled on the most widely spoken prestige languages in their areas, in the most widely used variants.

In due course, front-end investment in the circulation and use of texts extended not only to printing shops but to schools and colleges (and hence libraries), which helped produce the literate elite needed not just to sustain standard language, but, more importantly, to create the bureaucrats, lawyers, and investors needed to drive the emerging nation state. In this process, the scriptoria and the religious foundations supporting them were largely bypassed, and an emergent secularized society increasingly handled its religious establishment on a national basis congruent with the division of states: *cuius regio, eius religio*. Increasingly, this model was to be applied in Europe also to languages: *cuius regio, eius lingua*.

Non-speakers of the chosen language were left behind. Even as they promoted majority languages and the languages of urban centers (Febvre & Martin 1958/1990:186-190, 195-196), where distribution costs were low and therefore profits largest, the sustainable national cultures that grew out of these print communities marginalized regional languages and language varieties as standard languages were established and as the cultural capital that they represented grew larger. Provincial languages unsupported by standardizing economies or polities withered and declined. The pattern is well known: Steinberg (1961:120-126) cites the cases of the Baltic languages and Finnish, of Czech, and Basque, and Cornish. While most of these languages were kept alive by the printing press, but did not develop much of a market for the circulation of texts, Cornish did not. In Cornwall early accounts of the need for Cornish-speaking priests to hear confession (Ellis 1974:59) are followed by the suppression of the Prayer Book rebellion of 1549, whose leaders labeled the new order of service “a Christmas game.” “And so we Cornish men (whereof certain of us understand no English) utterly refuse this new English” (Rowse 1941:271; see also Tanner 2004:207). A victim of internal colonialism (a concept developed by Hechter 1975 and relevant here), the language went into steep decline, lacking rallying points and legitimacy (Hastings 1997:66-67). Cornish was never touched by the printing press because it was barely a written language, since Cornwall was away from centers of population and was in the hands of an English-speaking elite (Elliott-Binns 1955:404-405). At least the Welsh had Bishop Morgan’s Bible of 1588, printed in London and intended for use in churches, out of concern about the reluctance

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3 In fact the process of secularization was well underway even before the arrival of printing: universities, rather than religious houses, were increasingly the sites of scriptoria (Febvre & Martin 1958/1990:19, 23).
4 “Reduced to the status of quaint or vulgar jargons, in either case unsuitable for formal occasions, popular uses of the official language undergo a systematic devaluation” (Bourdieu 1991:54). Bourdieu is describing here the emergence of standard language, employing the concept of a linguistic market in which individuals compete for control of communicative capital – of the kind described by de Swaan (1993, 2001) in his idea of linguistic spheres of influence and of Q-value.
of rural communities to give up the old Papist practices, and out of unease about contamination from Ireland: religious unity trumped linguistic unity. But the march of anglicization continued as the printing press and the expanding educational system spread English-language literacy across the British Isles (Blank 1996).

Welsh barely made it through industrialization and urbanization to the slightly more benign world of today, in which language maintenance and revival carry at least some credibility. Finnish, Czech, and the Baltic languages were able to stage a return (if that is the correct term) by riding a second wave of national statehood in the nineteenth century – based in part on the written tradition established by printing.

2. Centralized language and devolved identity

While there are plenty of examples to be found of the direct suppression of the Celtic languages of the British Isles, for the most part the expansion of English was a consequence of economic opportunity and political and military necessity: a knowledge of English was increasingly essential for simple survival. It was the particular skill of the Tudors, and indeed of subsequent monarchs, to make concessions to regional identity. The first Henry Tudor played up his Welsh ancestry and had no hesitation in calling his eldest son Arthur; and such appropriation of regional identity was a hallmark of the reign of Queen Victoria with her firm self-identification with Scotland, an identity that her successors have continued to cultivate. I need hardly point out that the heir apparent inherits the dukedom of Cornwall and is in due course recognized as Prince of Wales. The purpose of this carefully calibrated system of regional identities is to create a sense of unity in diversity: regional identity and British identity are carefully intertwined. Related practices helped to sustain the British Empire.

I mention this diffusion of identity because it parallels linguistic practice in our own day, in which symbolic devolution is matched by operational centralization. It is widely acknowledged that the constitutional recognition of a wide range of languages in South Africa may be more significant symbolically than it is in practical terms. To an outsider it would seem that without a highly intrusive, and accordingly extremely expensive, language policy, involving all three forms of language planning (Cooper 1989) and requiring a willingness to place limits on the use of certain languages in order to encourage others, the hierarchization of official languages is all but inevitable – and the larger the number of languages involved, the greater the trend toward the emergence of a single lingua franca (Reagan 2001, Wright 2002, Webb 2004). I use this term advisedly: worldwide, English is primarily regarded not as the language of the oppressor, however we choose to define the notion of oppression, but as the language of opportunity, indeed of liberation (see for example Du Plessis 2000:103-104), among other reasons because it is seen not so much as empowering the native English-speaker as providing a means of communication across other languages. In a sense, it is the very inclusion of African

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5 On Welsh texts published in London, see Taylor 2002.
6 He also made considerable play of his connections with Cornwall, dating from the time of his exile in Brittany: see Ellis 1974:52.
languages by affording them constitutional recognition that enables this perception and hastens the *operational* emergence of English (as Du Plessis 2000:106 remarks, “Government is ... promoting monolingualism, even though it is supposed to work out a multilingual policy”).

And here we come back to Queen Victoria and her predecessors and successors. By claiming identification with its outlying realms – by representing Cornwall or Wales or Scotland – the royal family affords (or afforded) the cover that makes possible the steady anglicization of the machinery of economics and politics. Regional identity is legitimizied, but opportunity points directly to the metropolis: identity goes one way, but practice goes another. This historical process is closely mirrored in the politics of the European Union, to which I will shortly turn.

**Language tolerance and language promotion**

But first, a general observation. Some thirty years ago, Kloss launched the distinction between tolerance-oriented and promotion-oriented language rights, a distinction to which Skutnabb-Kangas 2000 and, particularly, Stephen May 2001, return in their recent work. It is a distinction often more easily grasped in the abstract than in practice, since frequently the promotion of language rights is executed through policies that do not address fundamental issues and hence it turns out to be little more than tolerance, or transitional bilingualism masquerading as stable bilingualism. Furthermore, language shift may be aided and abetted by official language policy but it is often a consequence of what might be described as the *virtual* (unofficial and implicit) promotion of a major language offering local opportunity, versus the *virtual* tolerance of a local language which, while enjoying institutional promotion, does not offer the kind of opportunities available through the major language with which it is in competition. We should not fall into the trap of supposing that the laissez-faire ethos surrounding those language domains that are not governed by institutional policy somehow constitutes an agent-less “natural” development. As Hamel points out in a recent article (Hamel 2006), the supposed “natural” process of globalization is assisted by overt national and international policies, driven by agents more or less clearly distinguishable, whose vested interest lies in promoting the illusion that the process over which they are presiding is natural. We can make a distinction here between hard policy (overt, articulated policy) and soft policy –

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7 South African language policy is one element in a larger worldwide debate about multiculturalism – a concept that many find deeply unsettling because it seems to threaten established notions of national and regional identity. For many, multiculturalism is essentially a transitional phenomenon: people of varying origins coming together to forge a common identity, or immigrants taking time to assimilate into the resident population. They are unwilling to accept the idea that open markets and rapid communications are creating a fluid and globalized population that must somehow be accommodated within national structures and accorded an opportunity to forge a sense of identity or indeed of multiple identities. Others are willing to entertain the possibility that a given nation or even individual can sustain a variety of cultural identities. The debate is particularly heated in a number of countries at present, among them the United States, France, and Australia (encapsulated in the current outrage of conservative talk-show hosts in the United States about the temerity of Latinos in singing a non-militaristic version of the national anthem in Spanish – a debate joined by the President of the United States himself).
but the absence of policy, like speaking a language without an accent, is simply a part (if I may use a simplified shorthand) of the oppressor’s mythology.

It is only in recent years that systematic efforts have been instituted to reverse the process of language decline at the local level, by instituting programs for language revival and language maintenance (Fishman 1991, 2001; Grenoble & Whaley 2005). The principal articulated justification for such efforts tends to be some notion of cultural identity, coupled with a belief that planned multilingualism is preferable to linguistic hegemony, and that ipso facto languages are worth preserving (for a balanced but critical examination of such concepts, see Patten and Kymlicka 2003; they are of course particularly favored by linguists: see Ammon 2003). Often left unarticulated are motives of political power: linguistic minorities may comprise potential blocs of voters, or may constitute a threat that is best neutralized through concession.

Without investment, or without a truly pressing political or social motivation, language revival is unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, such efforts often posit the possibility of stable bilingualism, since access to the language or languages of government is essential for the full development of economic and political opportunity. Without such bilingualism, the inclusion of the language among the constellation of languages in the country in question that are promoted through positive language policies may only lead to the economic exclusion of the population in question, in part through the creation of a language deficit.

Tolerance and promotion in transnational settings

What holds true within nation-states holds true across nation-states as well. While the European Union maintains, at least in theory, the equality of all languages recognized as languages of government within the borders of its member-states (for complex legal reasons this, at least as matters stand now, is regarded as a necessity), in practice numerous policies, formal and informal, have the effect of promoting languages of wider communication, such as French and English, in the EU’s deliberative bodies and in its bureaucracy (Ammon 2004:402). Minority languages in the member states are out of the picture altogether. As long as the formal policies of inclusion remain in place, they serve as a device to ignore exclusionary practices – and the more the European Union grows and takes in additional languages, the easier it becomes to justify exclusionary and

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8 I am, of course, concerned here with the central administrative and governance mechanisms of the European Union, not with linguistic arrangements within individual EU member states – a still larger and more complex issue.

9 Ammon 2003 makes a useful distinction among three levels of linguistic practice: minority languages, official EU languages, and working languages of the EU’s political bodies. The ill-fated draft constitution of 2004, rejected by French voters in May 2005 and by the Dutch in June 2005, gives scant attention to language issues, barely touching the divisive question of minority languages in anything but generalities. The Council of Europe has taken the lead in assisting minority languages, with the support of the EU. The two set up the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1981, and the EU has supported the Council’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), but, understandably, has avoided mandating policy within the member states on this issue.
discriminatory practices in the EU’s political bodies on practical grounds. And is the EU’s difficulty with the language issue merely a symptom of a wider linguistic homogenization linked to globalization (see Maurais & Morris 2003; Tonkin & Reagan 2003)?

If we see the European Union as in effect a single mega-state, we may ask whether the maintenance of de jure multilingualism (on the grounds of non-discrimination, for example, i.e. essentially tolerance-based) does not facilitate de facto monolingualism, as the strongest language – English – drives other languages into a hierarchy of exclusion (the view of Phillipson 2003 and others; and see Ammon 2004). This hierarchy of exclusion threatens even the major languages other than English (as Ammon 2001 suggests). Is the EU moving gradually towards a situation in which English dominates and other languages are pushed to varying degrees towards the periphery? There are some experts who maintain that, unfortunate though this turn of events may be, it is inevitable, and that it is best simply to improve knowledge of English among the non-English-speaking populations. Others suggest that the best that can be hoped for is to shift some of the burden on to the English speakers by imposing limits on the use of English under certain circumstances (Van Parijs 2004a, for example – but see François Grin 2004), or by attempting to tax English speakers to support the acquisition of English by those for whom it is not a native language (an approach similar to that of a government that chooses to maintain regional languages primarily at its expense; see for example Ammon 2004).

Pool and Fettes (1998; and see Pool 1996 and Fettes 2003a, 2003b) suggest that there are in fact several differing approaches to managing translingual communication (language learning, translation, a single ethnic language, an auxiliary language, or various approaches through technology) and that these should be explored as part of the institution of a rational language policy. But, as many have pointed out (recently, Wright 2004, Spolsky 2004), such decisions are seldom made rationally. What might be done by the smaller states, or at least those with the less widely-spoken languages, to guard their languages against language shift while promoting equality of communication, and hence maximum inclusion, in the EU as a whole?

Inclusion and exclusion in the United Nations and European Union

At the end of July last year, a group of scholars, parliamentarians, and government officials met in Vilnius, Lithuania, to discuss language policy implications of the expansion of the European Union. Among those present were numbers of figures whose work is familiar to scholars of language policy and planning – David Graddol, Robert Phillipson, Philippe Van Parijs, François Grin, Abram de Swaan, John Edwards, Paulin Djité, Ina Druviete, and others. Already one of the most linguistically complicated of the world’s various political entities, when regarded from the point of view of formal language policy, the EU has recently become considerably more complicated as a consequence of the addition of ten new members. In their concluding document, the group summarized the situation as follows:
Among the many questions raised by the expanded membership of the European Union is the question of languages. While the Treaty of Rome foresaw equality of status for national languages in EU institutions, the challenges to achieving this in practice are considerable, now that membership has grown to 25 member states with 21 official languages, more than 25 regional and minority languages, and many sizeable immigrant language communities, all with widely varying numbers of speakers. Without a careful, systematic, and well-funded approach to managing the multilingual nature of the EU, the languages and cultural values of some of the smaller states and non-state language groups could come under threat, compromising the principle of equality among EU members and opening the way to new kinds of conflict and struggle within and between nations.

Twenty years ago, I was involved in organizing a somewhat similar meeting, this time in New York, to discuss not the formal language policies of the United Nations but the informal language practices of that body (Tonkin & Edwards 1984). Language policy at the UN was always only partially about linguistic understanding: the official languages of the organization broadly reflected the outcome of World War II, in much the same way as those of the League of Nations reflected the outcome of World War I – but with the addition of language technology that permitted broader symbolic recognition of certain national languages (languages of government), largely enhancing prestige rather than comprehensibility (Tonkin 1996).10

The New York conference on the United Nations recognized the growing use of English in informal interactions among members of the Secretariat and the receding utility of French (English and French remain the two working languages of the Secretariat, as opposed to the General Assembly). Increasingly, informal practices were intruding on formal ones, and the proliferation of working languages of the General Assembly, coupled with severe budgetary constraints, was draining resources that might otherwise have gone into the maintenance of Anglo-French bilingualism in the operations of the Secretariat. Thus, in the absence of adequate support for formal language policies, informal practices were undermining formal expectations – and the more this process occurred the more it was accelerated by the declining utility of French, and hence the sidelining of those more competent in French than in English, and a declining insistence on the use of French (with consequent savings, welcomed no doubt by budget officers, in the expenditures of the language services in these areas). In short, despite formal policies, even in an organization as tightly bureaucratized as the United Nations Secretariat, the stable bilingualism anticipated by the founders was giving way to a classic case of language shift (in an organizational context one might use the term language creep) in the direction of English, the increasingly dominant language (on the distinction between “dominant” and “dominated” languages, see Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins 1988). Similar processes have been observed at UNESCO and in other United Nations bodies. They are often exacerbated and accelerated by underfunding.

10 I am thinking first and foremost about the advent of simultaneous interpretation thanks to IBM’s interpretation system, tested in the ILO before World War II and first used comprehensively at the Nuremberg Trials and then at the United Nations (Tonkin 1996); but the advent of the computer is also a major factor.
What applies to the United Nations applies to the considerably more complex structures of the European Union. Even before the admission of new members, the EU had long been unable to maintain *in practice* what its founding documents called for *in theory*—equality among all the languages of its member-states.\(^{11}\) Such equality, one of the driving myths of language policy, is seldom a reality under any language regime: we can do our best to institutionalize equality of languages, but in fact we can do so only with the full cooperation of human beings, who are fundamentally different from the abstractions called language and who are engaged in a constant rhetorical struggle for communicative advantage. In this struggle for communicative advantage, they often speak more than one of the languages in question and may speak and understand several, and they look for the most efficient way of getting things done *for themselves*, which is seldom in full conformity with formal language policy expectations. As Ammon (2003:393) reminds us, it is all too easy to reify languages and “treat them like biological organisms rather than systems of social behavior or social norms”—an error not uncommon among language planners.

In short, we tend to develop forms of language policy that assume societal multilingualism to the exclusion of individual multilingualism (i.e. many languages, each contained within its individual cell), and that are based on quite impractical notions about gatekeeping—an assumption that the designated linguistic mediators, namely translators and interpreters, are the only ones doing the mediating. In reality, individuals move freely within a multilingual ecosystem whose nature is determined above all by the individual’s assessment of the communication potential of individual languages (what Abram de Swaan 2001, borrowing the terminology of chemistry, calls the Q-value). The high Q-value of English, resulting, on the part of some native speakers, in English-language monolingualism, combines with another principle, the principle of what Van Parijs calls “maximin communication,” in which members of a group adapt themselves to the participant with least linguistic competence; and the result is a bias in favor of English.

Calling for “the pursuit of fair, democratic, and high-quality communication among all Europeans,” the participants in the Vilnius symposium on the European Union drew particular attention to certain “problematic trends” that appeared to be “widespread” in the EU:

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\(^{11}\) EU language policy is based on the so-called Regulation 1/58 (Council Regulation 1/58/EEC of 6 October 1958) putting working languages and official languages of the EU on an equal footing, i.e. applying to the operations of what was then the EEC the official languages of the member states. Initially only four languages were involved: Dutch, French, German, and Italian. Now that number has grown to twenty, but without any substantive change in formal language policy. In practice, a considerable body of law now recognizes the need for more limited language practices particularly in the smaller EU agencies. A few years ago, for example, in the so-called *Kik* case, the language rules of the charmingly named Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (which deals with trade marks) were upheld by the courts even though the OHIM conducts its business only in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. The ruling made a distinction between “institutions” of the EC (now EU) and “agencies” of the EC, arguing that the comprehensive language policy applies only to the former. Thus an essentially unworkable language policy is gradually undermined by the exigencies of the moment.
1. Failing to treat linguistic issues as a significant aspect of policy-making in such areas as higher education, scientific research, and communications media, to the detriment of the values and needs of small national and non-national language communities;

2. Tolerating or encouraging language practices which contravene the principles of multilingualism and linguistic equality, frequently leading to situations in which people with limited or no command of English are unable to participate on equal terms in the EU policy formation process;

3. Relying too much on existing language-related institutions and ideas that were never intended to address issues in the European or global context, entrenching a chronic lack of linguistic awareness and expertise in governments at all levels;

4. Dramatically reducing the teaching of languages other than English, making it less likely that Europeans will gain a deep understanding and appreciation of the culture of neighbouring countries, and reinforcing a disproportionate presence of British and American cultural products throughout the EU;

5. Avoiding open public discussion of language policy, and in particular of viable alternatives to the present situation of official but half-hearted multilingualism coupled with the unregulated and uneven spread of English.

While the Vilnius participants were committed to “fair, democratic, and high-quality communication among all Europeans,” no one, I think, was naive enough to believe that a language spoken by a few tens of thousands of people, most of whom are bilingual in English, on a small island in the Mediterranean (namely Maltese) is likely to maintain a position of strict equality with an English language spoken to some degree in every corner of the world. But behind this political fiction is an assumption of good-faith effort. And beyond this fiction – a political fiction built into the constituent principles of the EU – is a political fiction that we are likely to take rather more seriously, namely that all EU citizens are entitled, as far as is possible, to equal treatment. But the fiction of language equality, because it is accorded only limited recognition even in the formal activities of the EU, remains unobserved outside the formal structures and receives short shrift. Thus, while, in general, issues of language do not receive as much attention in the EU as they should, a more pressing problem is the fact that the empirical search for solutions to particular organizational difficulties may run counter to principles of language equality.

For example, the strength of the English language as a language of education and research, coupled with its widespread distribution across the world among a globalized elite, has resulted in huge advantages for English-speaking universities in attracting foreign students (and the accompanying income). In an attempt to level the playing-field, non-English-speaking universities are increasingly responding by setting up English-language programs of their own, and increasingly these programs and related trends are affecting these institutions’ regular programs of study by eroding the primacy of the official language or languages of these institutions. As many scholars have pointed out (Pool, Van Parijs, Kymlicka, to name just three), principles of distributive justice should require that the speakers of the dominant language, namely English, assist others in acquiring that language, and that they share the assets accumulated through their
linguistic advantage with the others; but of course the reverse is the case: the smaller the language, and hence the larger the communication deficit, the more its users must pay (for example by foreign-language instruction in schools) for access to the dominant international communication network. However, as long as English is perceived not as advantaging particular EU member states but as constituting a lingua franca, a kind of Esperanto, that can be used as a neutral medium among non-native English speakers, its hegemonic role will tend to be overlooked, particularly given the prestige and status associated with English as the language of the prevalent ideology of globalization. Thus informal linguistic practices will undermine the formal principles of the EU.

**Stable multilingualism for the European Union?**

The participants in Vilnius agreed on “five major commitments.” First they agreed on what they called “a common framework,” stating that

> A constructive, realistic language policy framework for the European Union of 25 countries is needed, that would balance the protection and celebration of linguistic diversity with the need for effective, high-quality communication amongst all the citizens of the EU....

Such a common framework might seem a statement of the obvious, but the lack of political will to insist on multilingual debate, for example, or on use of the full panoply of translation and interpretation, means that the celebration of diversity in the EU is increasingly symbolic rather than functional – not least because the formal policy of multilingualism is rightly perceived as laughably complex and ponderous. It serves the interests of the more powerful languages to keep in place a policy that manifestly cannot work because such a policy aids language shift in their direction – primarily in the direction of English.

For this reason, the Vilnius participants made their second “commitment” – to vigorous public and political debate on European language policy:

> In order to generate the necessary political will behind such a common framework, much more effort is needed to raise the level and intensity of public and political debate over language policy. The disadvantages of the current system, the vested interests that sustain it, and a range of positive policy alternatives need to be formulated in ways that can be discussed by ordinary people, reported on in the media, and addressed in practical terms by elected politicians. Long-term political constituencies and coalitions for the promotion of language equality, diversity, and sustainability need to be developed.

The recommendation reveals the bias of the group convened in Vilnius – namely towards multilingualism and language equality. But the topic is particularly important for nations whose hold on their own national languages in many cases dates only from the middle of the nineteenth century and the distribution of those languages is almost entirely limited to their own borders. These languages, lacking international currency, are severely threatened by the encroachment of other, more powerful languages, especially English,
even as English offers them economic, scientific and, in some sense, even cultural advantages that are not available to them through the medium of their own languages. In short, the twin ideals of the European Union – the maintenance of cultural diversity while pursuing economic integration – are in conflict, and the latter will win out over the former as long as the former is not carefully regulated and protected.

But this may mean that the search for a comprehensive European linguistic solution may have to go beyond conventional and simplistic measures. The third “commitment” enumerated five areas in which the “common language policy framework” would have to be applied, stressing that each “may involve a different set of solutions and a somewhat different policy process,” not least because each is regulated by different bodies either within the EU or within individual countries. These five areas are:

- the internal and professional communication of EU institutions, which is closely connected to the professional culture and self-governance of the institutions themselves;
- the official communication of EU institutions with citizens and governments, which is regulated through the EU policy process involving member states, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, etc;
- the management of the linguistic situation in EU member states, which comes under the jurisdiction of national parliaments and ultimately answers to the democratic process;
- the management of communication and cultural relations, internal to the EU, by an enormous range of public, professional, commercial, non-governmental, and private organizations and institutions, whose linguistic policies are largely autonomous but often highly constrained by economic and political factors;
- the external communication of EU institutions and member states with non-European states and in international organizations, which is affected by both global and local contexts and in turn may have implications for policy decisions within the EU itself.

The description of the fourth “commitment” suggested that public debate should focus on “competing visions of the linguistic future of the European Union.” The past twenty years or so have seen the development of new ways of thinking about language policy in complex settings, for example through the work of political economists, especially in Canada (Grin & Vaillancourt 1997), through the application of game theory to language choice (Selten & Pool 1991), through the application of Rawlsian and other concepts of distributive justice to language planning (Kymlicka 1989, Wright 2004, Ammon 2004), through advances in technology (including the technology and methodology of language learning), and, also because of far more sophisticated and realistic thinking about radical solutions such as planned language (Grin 2005; Phillipson 2003). The participants suggested

drawing lessons from diverse models of multilingualism around the world to better understand the dynamics and potential strengths and weaknesses of the EU language system, and its place within the global language system; defining and defending the status and needs of small national and non-national language communities, both indigenous and immigrant, within the EU; developing policy frameworks to ensure that any widely used
lingua franca does not undermine the continued vitality of national languages, the equal
treatment of their speakers in EU institutions, and the preservation of cultural diversity;
exploring the potential role of Esperanto within an EU language framework, with
particular regard to the economic benefits of its use as a pivot language in translation and
interpretation, its efficacy as an introduction to foreign language education, and its
advantages as a medium of intercultural communication; [and] projecting the future
expansion and impact of language and communication technologies, and of innovations
in foreign language education, on language learning and use within the EU.

Finally, the participants’ fifth “commitment” called for such specific actions as the
creation of a language policy conference for the smaller EU states, development of a
research network that “can provide timely and well-founded information to policy-
makers and the media” and a communication network “engaging a growing number of
key individuals in the academic, bureaucratic, and political establishments of EU member
states in the development of common solutions to shared linguistic concerns. These
efforts are already underway, and a virtual Internet-based “Nitobe Center” (the
symposium was named after Inazo Nitobe, the deputy director-general of the League of
Nations who first drew attention to the need for imaginative linguistic policies in
international organizations) is already under construction.

As matters now stand, the inner workings of the EU bureaucracy are set on a policy of de
jure multilingualism, which, because of poor calibration, unrealistic expectations and
benign neglect by the leadership is leading to de facto monolingualism. While the
speakers of major languages such as French, German, Spanish and Italian may seek to
keep their co-equal status, in essence each is engaged in political war with the next
language up the hierarchy in an environment in which the lack of consensus accords
power to the leading language or languages. The policymakers themselves, as
individuals, are increasingly enamored of their ability to negotiate their way in the global
lingua franca. But this internal bureaucratic squabble is merely a forerunner of a still less
benign state of affairs in which the gradual integration of economic and political domains
will be accompanied by the gradual annexation of parallel linguistic domains, leading to
ever greater constriction of the role and purpose of the smaller languages. Perhaps by
then we will not care, or perhaps, as happened with the fiasco of the new EU constitution,
local anxieties will reassert themselves in unexpected and ultimately damaging ways.
The goal should surely be a form of stable multilingualism backed up by rational and just
policies – an objective as unattainable in its entirety as peace and justice on this earth, but
worth working for anyway.

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