Woody Doane
University of Hartford

Introduction

     At the close of the twentieth century, racism remains a substantial barrier to the exercise of citizenship rights and the pursuit of social justice in the United States.  The persistence of substantial economic and social inequality along racial lines is buttressed by a complex of social practices, cultural understandings, and political ideologies that maintains racial stratification.  These racial understandings go beyond socially constructed characterizations of "race;" they also include the protocols governing relationships between racial groups, interpretations of culture and history, and images of "racialized" political issues.  This is a dynamic process.  As Omi and Winant (1986) have observed in their influential theory of racial formation, individual and collective racial understandings are continually being rearticulated as intellectuals and social movements challenge and defend existing ideologies and the current racial order.
     Racial ideologies and racial politics in the United States are in a state of constant flux, a result of both changing material conditions and political struggle.  Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in racial discourse, the collective text and talk of American society with respect to issues of race.  Through racial discourse, individuals and groups "frame" racial issues as they strive for ideological and political advantage.  As social constructionists have observed, both social movements and individual actors employ rhetorical strategies in order to make "claims" and promote a particular interpretation of a social issue.  Successful "claims making" enables practitioners to mobilize supporters, attract adherents, and neutralize or discredit political opponents.  Individual and collective racial understandings are continuously being contested, disrupted, and redefined through everyday experience, cultural images, and social conflict. Discourse, then, constitutes an arena in which political struggle occurs (van Dijk 1993).
     Discourse also provides a central connection between macro-level racial ideologies and the micro-level understandings of individuals.  Elite, media, and social movement discourses shape the social and cultural environments in which individuals attach meaning to situations (Gabriel 1998; van Dijk 1993).  For individual actors, frames--no matter how clearly articulated--provide the mental models or "common sense" beliefs through which individuals interpret social reality.  With respect to racial issues, individual mental models "explain" causes of phenomena (e.g., segregation, inequality) and influence political attitudes.  Consequently, the analysis of public discourse is essential to understanding the contestation and rearticulation of the social meaning of race in the United States.
     At the core of public discourse are the understandings attached to individual words.  Social constructionists studying the claims making process have analyzed the use of "code words" or catchphrases--powerful symbols that effectively summarize positions and connect to core social and cultural values (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987).  Yet the meanings or social definitions attached to individual words may in themselves be problematic.  As Karl Mannheim (1936:245) observed, "the same word, or the same concept in most cases, means very different things when used by differently situated persons."   Code words can themselves become objects of contestation, as opposing actors seek to redefine the meaning of concepts in order to gain rhetorical--and political--advantages.  In other words, they become "contestable moral notions" Madsen (1991:50-52) or "contested concepts" (Doane 1996:38)--a key battleground in discourse-based struggle.
     In current U.S. racial discourse, one central rhetorical struggle involves the differing and competing understandings of what constitutes "racism."  One of the most significant effects of the Civil Rights Movement upon the politics of race in the United States was the decline in the acceptability of overt displays of racism and ideologies of racial superiority/inferiority.  In the current social context, charges of "racism"--or the use of the "racist" label--carry an extreme negative connotation and serve as perhaps the ultimate rhetorical weapon in public discourse on racial issues.  Less obvious, however, is the emergence of racism as a "contested concept."  While there exists a widespread social consensus that "racism" is an extremely negative behavior, there is significant disagreement as to exactly what is "racism."  As I will argue in this paper, competing definitions of racism have significant strategic implications for racial discourse, and for the changing trajectories of racial politics in the United States.
     In this paper, I will explore the significance of racism as a "contested concept."  The starting point for this analysis will be to develop a typology of concepts of racism; that is, how racism is defined and how claims of racism are contextualized by the author.  While these competing conceptualizations are interesting in themselves, a second task will be to examine the strategic implications of competing definitions--the ways in which they subtly or overtly shape perceptions and discourse concerning racial issues.  From this platform, I will explore links between conceptualizations of racism and broader racial ideologies, with particular atttention devoted to the ways in which notions of racism buttress claims about the nature of race relations in the United States.  Finally, I will assess the implications of this research for the future evolution of racial discourse and race relations in the United States.

 Changing Racial Understandings: The Context for Discourse
 
    Racial discourse does not occur in a vacuum: it is shaped by the changing structure of race relations and racial understandings in the larger society.  While the analysis of the evolution of intergroup relations and racial ideologies is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief discussion will provide the necessary context for our analysis.  It has become commonplace for analysts of race and ethnic relations to characterize the Civil Rights Movement as a watershed in race relations in the United States.  For our purposes, what is significant was the broad-based social and political challenge to both the existing racial order and its supporting ideologies and cultural understandings.  Among its many effects, the Civil Rights Movement led to a decline in ideologies of racial superiority, a reduction of the most blatant forms of segregation amidst formal legal recognition of "civil rights," and an increase in support for racial equality (Morris and Herring 1995; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985).  Socially and politically, the expression of overtly racist attitudes became increasingly indefensible.  During the following decades, continued political and ideological struggle, changing racial and ethnic demographics, and economic and social change has continued to restructure the racial order.
     At the same time, much remains unchanged.  The more intractable problems of institutional racism, de facto segregation, economic inequality, and everyday racism remain embedded in American society (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Massey and Denton 1993; Feagin and Vera 1995; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).  Racial conflict remains a pervasive aspect of American life and public opinion polls consistently indicate a substantial gap between whites and peoples of color on racial issues.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the "problem of the color line" is arguably as significant as when W.E.B. Du Bois (1995 [1903]:54) characterized it as the problem of the twentieth century.
     One significant change in U.S. race relations has been in the form of racism, the institutional and cultural practices through which whites strive to maintain their hegemonic position in the racial order.  The Civil Rights Movement triggered a crisis for white supremacy in that it was clear that there would be ongoing challenges to the institutional underpinnings of white dominance.  In response, whites began a process of countermobilization that is often characterized as the "racial reaction" (Omi and Winant 1986) or the racial backlash (Steinberg 1995).  This defense of position was problematic, however, in that historical strategies of overt racial discrimination were no longer politically feasible in the face of the now widely-accepted value of "racial equality" (a term which is itself a "contested concept").  What has emerged has been a series of new "racial projects" (Omi and Winant 1986) geared toward the preservation of white privilege and the containment of challenging social movements.
     At the core of the white racial reaction has been the recasting of racial ideologies or understandings to defend white advantages while simultaneously acknowledging the value of "racial equality."  The central paradigm in this endeavor has been "color-blindness" (Omi and Winant 1986; Carr 1997), the assertion that race should not "matter" in public decision making or private interaction.  This claim of "color-blindness" has enabled practicioners to claim the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement (judging people by the "content of their character") while attacking race-based remedies such as affirmative action and political redistricting as illegitimate and deriding multiculturalism as "identity politics" or "political correctness."   Closely related to the "color-blind" paradigm has been the strategy of denial--the claim that racism is no longer a significant problem in American society, except for the deeds of a few "bigots" whose actions are broadly condemned.  In this context, claims of discrimination can be dismissed as "oversensitivity" (Essed 1991), making excuses for personal shortcomings (Blauner 1990), or "playing the race card" in an attempt to gain personal or political advantage.
     Clearly, our consideration of the "color-blind" paradigm is but a brief summary of a complex constellation of racial understandings.  Moreover, the construction and reconstruction of racial ideologies is an ongoing process, as claims and counterclaims are presented in the course of political struggle.  Much of this process of articulation and rearticulation of racial understandings takes place in the public discourse revolving around racial events, occurrences whose racialized character triggers extensive public discussion and consideration of racial issues.  On a national level, this includes events such as the Rodney King beating and the trial of the Los Angeles Police Department officers, the O.J. Simpson trial, the burning of black churches, and the racially-motivated murder in Jasper, Texas.  Racial events also occur on a local level, with dialogue triggered by incidents of police brutality, school desegregation debates, elections, and other phenomena that evoke racial divisions.  Taken together, these discussions or debates of racial events constitute the arena in which racial understandings are presented, challenged, and defended--and are reshaped in the process.  It is this discourse which will be the focus of our analysis.
     Data for this analysis were collected from various written media (letters to newspapers, public statements quoted in newspaper articles, and letters to public agencies) in which a range of social issues were discussed.  In each instance, the author presented specific claims about the nature of racism.  Given the goals of this research--mapping different discursive strategies for defining and contextualizing racism--analytical categories were reflexively derived from the data (on "ethnographic content analysis," see Altheide 1987) as opposed to a more formal discourse or content analysis (for examples of similar analytical strategies, see Binder 1993, Doane 1996, Daniels 1997, and Berbrier 1998).  To complement this analysis, open-ended survey questions asking the respondent to provide an explicit definition of racism were obtained from a larger study of racial identities and racial attitudes among college students.

 What is Racism?: Discourse and Debate

     While the focus of this analysis is on public discourse, a brief consideration of the academic debate can provide some points of reference for the following discussion.  At the same time, we should take note of the fact that the academic discussion of racism is decidedly marginal to the larger public discourse (an interesting commentary on the lack of political relevance of our discipline).  Journalists and members of the public do not normally draw upon academic sources (especially theoretical debates) when debating public issues.  Consequently, we might expect to find considerable discrepancies between academic conceptions of racism and those used in general social dicsourse.
      It is safe to say that conceptualizations of racism by scholars of race and ethnic relations have undergone considerable evolution.  Initially, racism was used in a relatively narrow manner to describe adherence to ideologies of racial (i.e., "biological" or "genetic") superiority and inferiority (Benedict 1947; van den Berghe 1967).  As attention shifted to issues of prejudice and discrimination, this "classical" definition was broadened to include prejudical attitudes or discriminatory acts directed towards members of other "racial" groups--individual beliefs or behavior that did not necessarily have to be connected to an ideology of biological supremacy.  From this perspective, racism was essentially a social-psychological phenomenon.  Beginning in the 1960s, a new formulation of racism was introduced in which it was explicitly linked to institutional practices rather than individual domination (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Blauner 1972).  In this context, racism could be both overt and covert, attitudinal and behavioral, individual and institutional.  The key element was that it maintained and reproduced a system of race-based domination and subordination (Essed 1991; Wellman 1993).   Over the past two decades, many new refinements of formulations of racism have emerged in an attempt to characterize changes in social relationships.  For example, such terms as everyday racism, modern racism, and symbolic racism (Essed 1991; McConahay 1986; Kinder and Sears 1981) have attempted to capture the nuances of attitudes and behavior in a society where overt and blatant displays of racism are generally considered socially unacceptable.  More recent work has depicted racism as multidimensional (Appiah 1990; Goldberg 1990; Solomos and Beck 1996:25) and as a fundamental feature of the social structure of the United States (Omi and Winant 1986; Bonilla-Silva 1997).  While no unified conceptualization of racism has emerged, it is clear that the evolution of academic discourse is towards more complex and systemic formulations where racism is viewed as an aspect of society rather than a characteristic of individuals.

 "Racism" and Public Discourse: Contested Meanings

     One key element of racial discourse is the author's attempt to present a specific interpretation of a racial issue or racial event.  In addition to claims-making, authors work to discredit or undermine specific and generalized political opponents.  Given the general social consensus that racism violates social norms and the strong negative valuation attached to the "racist" label, charges of racism are a significant rhetorical weapon.  Not surprisingly, authors will seek to conceptualize racism--either explicitly or implicitly--in a manner that will both strengthen their claim and weaken those of their challengers.  This strategy becomes evident in the following exchanges.
     Defining Racism: Institutional Phenomenon vs. Prejudice
     The interpretation of racial events provides an arena in which competing claims come to the fore.  For example, in a syndicated article entitled "Ingrained American Racism Killed My Son," Camille Cosby (1998:C1) presents an interpretation of the murder of her son, Ennis Cosby, by a young immigrant.  According to Cosby, the murderer "did not learn to hate black people in his native country" (the Ukraine), but instead was influenced by the racism and prejudice that "are omnipresent and eternalized in America's institutions, media, and myriad entities."  For Cosby, racism is clearly more than a matter of individual hatred as she cites a number of examples of institutional and cultural racism ranging from health studies to the media to voting rights.  Included in the essay is a quote from James Baldwin: "The will of the people, or the State, is revealed by the State's institutions.  There was not then, nor is there now, a single American institution which is not racist."
     When published in The Hartford Courant, this letter evoked a series of responses in the "Letters to the Editor" section of the newspaper.  The first correspondent (Cosby response 1) expressed sympathy for the Cosby tragedy, but described the murder as Ennis Cosby being "killed by a man who happened to be white."  He characterized Cosby's essay as "racist" and asserted that (emphasis added) "to take out her hatred on the founding fathers and great heroes of our country (Cosby had discussed the slaveowning status of several major historical figures) is insulting to most Americans."  In the same vein, a second letter (Cosby response 2) condemned Cosby's article as "blatantly racist" for "saying that the whole country is racist."  The author opined that "Cosby should not allow the racial hatred shown by some Americans (presumably including Ennis Cosby's murderer) to influence her opinion of all Americans" and suggested that (emphasis added) Cosby "get over her hate and meet all the Americans who treat others equally regardless of their race."
     There are both differences and similarities between the two accounts.  For the first critic, the murder of Ennis Cosby was unrelated to race (the killer "happened to be white").  In contrast, the second critic seems to accept that the murder of Ennis Cosby was the result of racial hatred, but implies that this hatred is a rather isolated occurrence.  More significantly, both critics employ a definition of racism as hatred as a core element of their understanding of the issue.  This then enables both critics to develop a syllogism that concludes with Cosby hates (by criticizing institutions and historical figures, by labeling the "whole country" as racist), therefore, Cosby is a racist.  Thus, we have a perspective where a critique of racism in American culture and institutions leads to the critic being labeled a "racist" and the critique essentially dismissed as "hate speech."
     These criticisms of Cosby's essay in turn produced a new round of rejoinders.  At this juncture, the discourse shifted completely from the analysis of the murder of Ennis Cosby to a debate on the nature of racism.  One respondent (Cosby response 3) pronounced him/herself "infuriated" by the criticism of Cosby and described a recent college course that opened her/his eyes to "the truth that African Americans and other folks of color have been and often still are disenfranchised in this land of ours," a statement that implies a broader, more structural conceptualization of racism.  A second correspondent (Cosby response 4) more explicitly addressed the nature of racism.  He criticized the critics of Cosby for the incorrect suggestion that "anti-black sentiment held by whites is racism, just as anti-white sentiment held by African-Americans is racism."  In contrast, he stated that "for African-Americans, racism in america takes many forms, including obstacles to access to positions of power in government and business, unfair and degrading legislation, lower quality education in predominantly black areas, offensive cultural stereotypes and, sometimes, deadly violence."  While acknowledging that anti-white sentiment exists, he asserted that few examples of anti-white racism "do more than hurt the feelings of those whites involved."  He concludes with the statement that "the word ‘racism' cannot accurately refer to both social phenomena [racism against African-Americans and anti-white sentiment] because they have different roots and different effects."
     Both responses to Cosby's critics describe racism as broad-based and rooted in the structure of American society.  From this platform, they characterize their opponents as uninformed and unwilling (they respond by being "insulted") to face the "painful" truth of the pervasiveness of racism in American society.  In addition, the second respondent takes the position, one held by many academics, that racism towards African Americans (and presumably other peoples of color) is qualitatively different from anti-white "sentiment."  Clearly, their understandings of racism are substantially different from the initial critics of Camille Cosby.
     Several themes are illuminated in this exchange.  First, it is clear that there are dramatically different ways of interpreting "racial events" in the United States.  Second, we are provided with a clear illustration of racism as a "contested concept."  All five authors employ the term, however, there are clear lines of conflict between the view of racism as prejudice or hate and the view of racism as a more structural phenomenon.  Finally, the discourse illustrates the power of the concept of racism as the discussion evolves from the analysis of the murder of Ennis Cosby to a debate on the nature of racism in American society.

     What is Racism? Who is Racist?
     One important issue that is related to the debate over the nature of racism is the question: who is (or can be) racist?  Competing definitions of racism lead to different answers to this question.  In general, if racism is defined as race-based prejudice or discrimination, then it seemingly logically follows that anyone can be racist, including members of both dominant and oppressed groups.  On the other hand, if racism is linked to institutional power, then it follows that only members of the dominant group--whites in the United States--can be racist.  These divergent perspectives are illustrated by the following exchange.
     In the 1990s, many "racial events" have involved issues of police behavior.  Some incidents (e.g., the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles Police officers) receive national attention, while others evoke debate on a local or state level.  As part of an ongoing discourse over police brutality in Connecticut, a letter in the Hartford Courant offered the following interpretation of events (Racism 1).  

Finding a solution to the problems of police brutality and racial profiling requires us to deal first with the lingering problem of white racism.  Racism is a fundamental feature of American society.  Because virtually every white participates in this racist culture, most harbor some racist images or views.

Racism is not a white problem alone.  In the Los Angeles riots of 1992, Koreans seemed to be the objects of discrimination and racism as blacks attacked and looted Korean businesses.  This is not to say that only blacks or only whites harbor racist views, but that some people, regardless of race, still profess archaic and stereotypical views about those who are different from themselves. . . . .

The only solution for racism is for both sides to cooperate in abolishing stereotypes.  Racism never functions one way; it manifests itself in both the oppressed and the oppressors, and who is to say which group is which, as everyone is constantly accusing anyone but themselves for all of their problems.

 By its very nature, the title of the University of Connecticut course offends me.  It in itself is racist.  A sociology course entitled "Colonialism and its Racist Ramifications" or one titled "Racism: Its Causes and Effects" might be worthy of consideration.

Will UConn offer another course to balance this one, titled perhaps "Black Racism," with special attention to the Rev. Al Sharpton and nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan, or "Asian Racism" focusing upon the xenophobia of the Japanese?  To be truly politically correct, nonjudgmental and egalitarian, such diverse offerings should be made available to all students.  However, since we live in a climate with double standards, such will obviously not be the case.

This author makes several interrelated claims.  The course is "racist" because it is unbalanced and nonegalitarian in its treatment of different racial groups.  While racism is not explicitly defined, the implicit definition is that it entails unequal treatment on the basis of race or prejudicial attitudes towards other groups.  Finally, in the interest of fairness (vs. the "climate with double standards"), the discussion of white racism must be balanced by consideration of "black racism" or racism on the part of other racial minorities  (note the specific examples provided).
     In contrast, a defender of the course (White Racism 2) commended the faculty member for offering a course "in which students can actually learn the truth."  Her support is based upon a dramatically different claim:

 Being in a country that has been built upon racism, a country in which racism has been rooted, we can't assume that it will just disappear.  We just began to confront the problem 30 years ago.  What form of racism can be more evident than white racism?  From the Trail of Tears to the Holocaust on down to Sheff vs. O'Neill [a school desegregation case involving Connecticut schools], our past and present show us that white racism has been the primary cause of social dysfunction.

     Shifting Meanings: Redefining Racism
     Thus far, I have framed the conflict as being between individual and institutional/structural conceptions of racism.  While this is the major division in contemporary racial discourse, the dynamic nature of discourse creates space for the emergence of new understandings of racial issues--and new interpretations of what constitutes racism.  This realignment was evident in a debate over desegregation or "racial balance" in a suburban Connecticut community (for a more detailed analysis of this conflict, see Doane 1996).  During the course of this debate, letters to the editor in a local newspaper presented a new perspective on racism.
     The first author (West Hartford letter file 39) claimed that:

proponents of the [racial balance] plan fail to see that their position is firmly rooted in racial stereotypes. . . .  Are they saying that the racial and ethnic mix of students determines the quality of a school?  While they certainly won't say that, it is the logical implication of their position.  And that my friends is a racist position.

 I am proud of the educationally rich environment shared by all West Hartford students of a naturally achieved diversity of race, religion, ethnic background and socio-economic status.  State-mandated racial balance, which in my opinion is a form of racism, should not distract us from the goal of attaining educational balance--the assurance that each student will be provided with the resources and environment necessary to achieve an equitable education.

 Now it is clear that our School Board's agenda goes beyond equitable distribution of our town's educational resources.  Their agenda categorizes us, the people of the town of West Hartford, the pigment of our skins, by the amount of money that we make, by the language our parents speak, and then gerrymanders our school districts to create their misguided version of what is meant by equal access--homogenized ratios.

To some of us who believe that people should be judged on their strength of character, and who believe that racism will not be eliminated until our nation, states, and towns become color blind, this agenda is repugnant.

 But discrimination is no longer the worst problem we face in trying to get along and get ahead on our diverse country.  The constant focus on our differences is.  Children are being taught that they have more that divides them as Americans than unites them: from the Census Bureau's adding racial and ethnic categories, to universities' obsession with segregated dorms and social clubs; from state laws that ask employers to count color, to disastrous bilingual programs that ensure failure for so many students who are placed in them.

Why don't we cry out against these bigoted policies?  Why don't we tell the politicians who support them that more harm than good comes from well-intentioned programs based on color, sex, and ethnic counting?

     Explicit Definitions: A Preliminary Reconnaissance
     Thus far, our discussion has concentrated upon the conceptualization of racism in the course of public debate of racial issues.  While the authors cited above made explicit statements about the nature of racism, their definitions of racism were implicit.  To complement the analysis of racial discourse, I devised an open-ended question where respondents were asked to provide an explicit definition of racism.  This question was then included as part of  a larger racial attitudes survey that was conducted among a group of primarily first and second-year college students.  Responses were coded on the basis of components of the definition of racism provided by the subject.
     As might be expected, the most dominant response (50% of the respondents, n=84) defined racism as prejudice, discrimination, or stereotyping that was explicitly linked to race.  Another 35.8% provided a definition that included prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, fear, or ignorance, but did not explicitly mention race.  One interesting variation was that 8.3% of respondents defined racism as prejudice or discrimination based upon race, but then added one or more additional social categories such as religion, gender, or class.  3.6% of respondents defined racism as prejudice or discrimination "against minorities," and 2.4% stated that racism "didn't exist" or "couldn't be defined."  No responses provided a structural or institutional definition of racism.
     While these results are admittedly preliminary, they do indicate a strong tendency to define racism in general terms as prejudice or discrimination; that is, as essentially an individual attitude or behavior as opposed to a structural phenomenon.  With respect to our earlier discussion regarding who can be racist, only a small percentage of respondents specifically restricted racism to prejudice and discrimination against members of minority or subordinate groups (in another item on the survey, only 3% of respondents agreed with the statement that "because racism reflects power, only whites can be racist").  Of particular interest was the subgroup that defined racism as prejudice or discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, or class in addition to race (I have observed this practice in informal classroom surveys for several years).  This suggests at least the possibility of racism evolving into a generalized term for prejudice and discrimination--a concept torn from its historical roots.  I will explore the implications of differing conceptions of racism in the following discussion.

     Racism as a Contested Concept: Implications
     The discursive examples presented above illuminate the role of racism as a "contested concept."  What is important to emphasize, however, is that the differences go beyond semantics and reflect fundamentally opposite formulations of race relations in the United States.  Furthermore, the contested nature of "racism" plays a significant role in recasting the politics of race and in reproducing white hegemony.  In this section, I will explore the implications of current racial discourse for the evolution of racial politics in the United States.
     As demonstrated above, a key bifurcation in the conceptualization of racism is between racism as individual attitude or behavior (hatred, stereotyping, unequal treatment) and racism as a set of cultural and institutional practices.  This conflict in turn leads to important differences with respect to policy implications for addressing racism.  If racism is defined as a set of institutional and cultural practices, then the logical policies would include structural change, vigilant enforcement of civil rights laws, race-based remedies, and significant changes in cultural practices.  On the other hand, if racism is viewed as a problem of individual attitudes and behavior, then the logical response is to condemn and punish individual acts of prejudice and discrimination.
     The implications extend beyond policy and into the realm of discourse.  Defining racism in individual terms both reinforces and is reinforced by the "post-Civil Rights Movement" frame which holds that racism in the United States is no longer a significant problem, but has been reduced to the isolated acts of "bigots" or racial supremacists.  For individual whites, it is possible to inoculate oneself against charges of racism by comparing oneself (favorably) to white supremacist groups, by asserting that "I am not a racist," and by pointing to individual affiliations ("my best friend") or non-racist actions (Culp 1993).  Defining racism as individual acts or attitudes also creates a double bind for victims of racism.  Charges may be difficult to substantiate, especially when denials or alternative explanations are given equal or greater weight (Essed 1991).  In addition, charges of racism--as shown above--may be open to being labeled "racist" for allegedly exhibiting hatred or unequal treatment.  Given the seeming ascendancy of individual definitions of racism, what is emerging is a world in which it is difficult to challenge or even envision institutional racism, and where it is increasingly difficult to challenge individual racist acts.
     The debate over "who is (or can be) a racist" also has important political implications.  As I have indicated elsewhere (Doane 1996), the "racist" label has a powerful negative valuation--such that to employ the term racist often leads to claims and counterclaims regarding the use of the label and deflects attention from the original issue.  If racism is viewed as rooted in institutional structures, then--as several authors claimed above--white racism would logically be viewed as the most significant social problem and the onus of change is placed squarely on the shoulders of white Americans.  On the other hand, if racism is merely a matter of individual hatred, stereotyping, or unequal treatment, then it would logically follow that anyone can be racist.  Such a perspective has substantial political advantages for white Americans in that charges of racism on the part of whites can be countered by claims of "black racism" (e.g., one of the authors cited above invoked Louis Farrakhan and Al Sharpton) or racism on the part of other oppressed racial groups.  If, as one author suggested, equal standing is given to both forms of racism, then "black racism" can be invoked to neutralize challenges to the existing racial order and to undermine the historical and institutional pervasiveness of white racism and discussions of racism are reduced to a series of claims and counterclaims.
     To the extent that the "individual" definition of racism is gaining ascendancy, the overall effect of the rhetorical struggle is to solidify the dominance of "color-blind" racial ideology.  As I observed earlier, the role of "color-blind" ideology is to defend white advantages while ostensibly taking an antiracist ("colorblind") position.  Within this context, individualistic and dualistic (majority and minority) notions of racism obscure the existence of institutional racism and supports the denial of racism.  Further, by simultaneously placing racism at the margins (the acts/attitudes of a few) and universalizing it (asserting racism as a characteristic of all groups), this discourse places whites on a par with peoples of color as perpetrators and victims and provides a platform from which to refute claims of racism and calls for redress of racial inequality.
     Yet racial ideologies and racial discourse are in a state of constant change, as social change and political struggle result in the constant rearticulation of racial understandings.  New modes of discourse emerge in the course of media representations and social movements; these new understandings then become part of the political process.  In the examination of current racial discourse, it is possible to discern both emergent conceptualizations of racism and new linkages between definitions of racism and emerging frames for understanding or interpreting racial issues.  While such an analysis admittedly contains an element of speculation, it may also provide important insights on the future course of racial ideologies in the United States.
     In our earlier discussion, one emerging definition of racism was race consciousness or the use of racial categories, a conception that is very compatible with "colorblind" racial ideology and the notion that race doesn't "matter."  This definition, if it becomes prevalent, has significant political implications.  As evident in the Jarvis (1997) quotation presented above, this redefinition of racism can be employed to attack laws requiring employers and educational institutions to provide data on racial representation.  It can even be used to attack the data gathering activities of the U.S. Census Bureau.  As Alan Jenkins (1999) recently observed, bans on (or non-compliance with) racial data collection are becoming increasingly widespread.  If the collection of racial data is eliminated, then it will become difficult, if not impossible, to provide credible evidence of patterns of discrimination or even to assess the relative degree of racial inequality.  In other words, white advantages will become unassailable--a position made possible by a discourse employing the language of "color blindness" and antibigotry.
     Existing formulations of racism also can be linked to emerging new understandings of racial issues.  In the context of "color blind" racial ideology,  individualistic definitions of racism and the assertion that anyone can be racist provide a logical foundation for an emerging "white as victim" discourse (Gallagher 1994; Doane 1996).  Within this framework, it is claimed that "minority racism" exists alongside white racism and that whites are equally or even more likely to be targets of racism.  In contemporary racial politics, it is the logical corollary of claims of "reverse discrimination" and the existence of a racial "double standard," except that the "victim" status of whites is deliberately highlighted.  Politically, casting whites as victims provides a strong base for neutralizing minority claims for racial justice and for activating white countermobilization for the defense of racial advantages--now cast as fighting for equal treatment.
     There are also important linkages between contested definitions of racism and white supremacist discourse.  On the one hand, this is ironic in that white supremacists are often used as exemplars of racism/racists, with the implication being that those who are not white supremacists are then not racist.  Yet as several observers (Daniels 1997; Gabriel 1998) have noted, white supremacist rhetoric echoes many of the same themes as "mainstream" racial discourse, often providing important political cover for more sanitized versions of the same ideas.  As Berbrier (1998:437) observed, the "normalization" of racism--the claim that everyone is a racist--has led to racism being redefined by white supremacists in positive terms as a sense of group pride and cultural preservation (whites are merely engaging in the same practices as members of oppressed groups).  Similarly, the equating of white and minority "racism" and the "white as victim" discourse resonates with a supremacist discourse in which whites are now the oppressed racial group in the United States.  If past practices are any barometer, these themes will become more prevalent in the future.

 Conclusion: Racial Discourse and Race Relations

     In this paper, I have examined the role of definitions of racism in contemporary racial discourse.  Vocabularies and discursive frames reflect ideologies and cultural understandings.  More significantly, they shape our interpretations of racial events and condition our perceptions.  Politically, code words and catchphrases serve as important weapons in the ongoing struggle for political power and social and economic resources.  Racial ideologies serve to challenge or defend the existing state of race relations in the United States.
     Substantively, I have outlined how individualistic and universal conceptions of racism resonate with "color-blind" racial ideology.  Defining racism as individual hatred or discrimination creates a phenomenon that can be condemned by all, while at the same time eliminating the need for structural changes to address institutional racism.  The claim that racism is universal--that anyone can be racist--removes from whites the burden of responsibility for past and present racism and even enables assertions of white victimization.  In general terms, the effect of this racial discourse is to reinforce white domination in the United States by reducing or marginalizing challenging perspectives.  Carried to its extreme, it creates a one-dimensional context in which it becomes increasingly difficult to conceptualize, let alone challenge, the continuing significance of institutional racism--much in the manner that the government of Oceania in George Orwell's 1984 (1961 [1949]) sought to eliminate "thought crime" by eliminating any challenging vocabulary.  Ironically, the claim that "race no longer matters" is being used to ensure the persistence of racial inequality.
     Finally, this examination of popular discourse discloses a sobering reality for progressive and antiracist sociologists.  While scholars of race and ethnic relations have developed increasingly nuanced understandings of racism, it appears that academic discourse is becoming increasingly marginal to the popular understanding of racial issues.  As I have argued in this paper, the recasting of what constitutes racism has become a powerful weapon in the arsenal of those who oppose the movement towards racial justice and are willing to accept (and benefit from) the status quo.  If this evolution of racial discourse is to be challenged, then antiracist academics must engage racial understandings not only in the classroom, but also in community forums and in the popular media.  To remain above the fray is to acquiesce in the persistence of American racism.